Warfighting for cyber deterrence: a strategic and moral imperative

Theories of cyber deterrence are developing rapidly. However, the literature is missing an important ingredient—warfighting for deterrence. This controversial idea, most commonly associated with nuclear strategy during the later stages of the Cold War, affords a number of advantages. It provides enhanced credibility for deterrence, offers means to deal with deterrence failure (including intrawar deterrence and damage limitation), improves compliance with the requirements of just war and ultimately ensures that strategy continues to function in the post-deterrence environment. This paper assesses whether a warfighting for deterrence approach is suitable for the cyber domain. In doing so, it challenges the notion that warfighting concepts are unsuitable for operations in cyberspace. To do this, the work constructs a conceptual framework that is then applied to cyber deterrence. It is found that all of the advantages of taking a warfighting stance apply to cyber operations. The paper concludes by constructing a warfighting model for cyber deterrence. This model includes passive and active defences and cross-domain offensive capabilities. The central message of the paper is that a theory of victory (strategy) must guide the development of cyber deterrence

Britain's emerging cyber-strategy

© RUSI JOURNAL AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2016. In recent years, cyber-power has attracted a great deal of attention in government strategy and security reviews. This has been matched by regular increases in budget and the establishment of new organisations to co-ordinate UK activity in cyberspace. The result is the emergence of UK cyber-strategy. However, David J Lonsdale argues that at present UK cyber-strategy is not comprehensive, nor does it cohesively bring together the different elements of cyber-power to effectively serve UK policy objectives. Here, he identifies the components of the UK’s emerging cyber-strategy and assesses the UK’s approach against a comprehensive cyber-strategy framework. The latter includes seven elements: defence; cyber-espionage; information manipulation; widespread disruptive attacks; raids; joint operations; and deterrence

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: A return to nuclear warfighting?

© 2019 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) represents a significant shift in U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Using Cold War vintage theory, this article assesses whether the NPR signals a return to nuclear warfighting. The NPR is assessed against five primary drivers for warfighting strategy: enhanced deterrence; to deal with deterrence failure; to maximize damage limitation; to provide a theory of victory; and adherence to just-war theory. The article concludes that although the NPR represents a step in the direction of warfighting, it does not fully embrace it. This is primarily because the NPR fails to endorse an unrestrained theory of victory

Ordering and controlling the dimensions of strategy

Colin Gray’s dimensions of strategy, built upon the earlier work of Clausewitz and Howard, has theoretical, practical, and pedagogic value for the Strategic Studies community. This paper further develops the theory, arguing that the dimensions can be controlled or managed to improve strategic performance. The dimensions are divided into two categories: “internal” and “external” to the process of strategy. The paper describes the dynamic process by which the internal dimensions, which can be controlled, are used to exert influence over the external dimensions that are beyond the control of the strategist. It is argued that six dimensions hold the key to strategic success: politics and the five dimensions concerned with warfighting. This conclusion validates the Clausewitzian paradigm with its emphasis on policy and battle

KURE Fest 2011

An hour after KURE Fest 2011 ended, rapper Kreayshawn, dressed in pajamas and a large bodyguard, walked up the stairs by the M-Shop and stared at us. She just stared like she wanted us to say something to her. Maybe she was hoping we had a joint or just needed a light. “Hey,” we muttered. “Hey?” she said and then walked away in a confused shuffle. “What just happened?” we all said. Then it was over. Kreayshawn, the pajamas, the good vibes – it was all over until next year

Beyond just war : military strategy for the common good

The objective of this paper is to move ethical discourse on military strategy beyond the confines of the established War Convention. This is achieved by utilizing the Common Good, a concept found in political philosophy and theology. The common good acts as a positive organizing concept for socio-political activity. With its focus on peace, development and the flourishing of the individual and community, the common good poses a significant challenge to strategy. This paper constructs an approach to strategy that is compatible with the common good. Importantly, it does so whilst respecting the pursuit of victory as an indispensable component of strategy’s true nature. The theory presented in this paper is then tested in relation to four different modes of strategy: regular war; irregular war; deterrence; and cyberwar

The spatial clustering of ultraluminous infrared galaxies over 1.5 < z < 3

We present measurements of the spatial clustering of galaxies with stellar masses 1011 M, infrared luminosities 1012 L, and star formation rates 200 M yr-1 in two redshift intervals: 1.5 &lt; z &lt; 2.0 and 2 &lt; z &lt; 3. Both samples cluster moderately strongly, with spatial correlation lengths of r0 = 6.14 B1 0.84 h-1 Mpc for the 2 &lt; z &lt; 3 sample and r0 = 5.36 B1 1.28 h-1 Mpc for the 1.5 &lt; z &lt; 2.0 sample. These clustering amplitudes are consistent with both populations residing in dark matter halos with masses of 7 C 1012 M, which is comparable to that seen for optical QSOs at the same epochs. We infer that a minimum dark matter halo mass is an important factor for all forms of luminous, obscured activity in galaxies at z &gt; 1, both starbursts and active galactic nuclei. Adopting plausible models for the growth of dark matter halos with redshift, the halos hosting the 2 &lt; z &lt; 3 sample will likely host poor to rich clusters of galaxies at z = 0, whereas the halos hosting the 1.5 &lt; z &lt; 2.0 sample will likely host L* elliptical galaxies or poor clusters at z = 0. We conclude that ultraluminous infrared galaxies (ULIRGs) at z 2.5 likely signpost stellar buildup in galaxies that will reside in clusters at z = 0 and that ULIRGs at z 1.7 signpost stellar buildup in sources that will either become L* elliptical galaxies or reside in poor clusters at z = 0